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I. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute's new Restatement of the U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration is only barely underway, and the
reporters began with a chapter, namely the recognition and enforcement
of awards, that should represent for them a comfort zone of sorts within
the overall project. Yet, already a number of difficult, and to some
extent unexpectedly difficult, questions have arisen.
Some of the
difficulties stem from the very nature of an ALI Restatement project.

* Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law & Walter Gellhorn Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School.
I.
On ALl Restatement projects in general, see Kristen David Adams, The American
Law Institute: Justice Cardozo's Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. Ill. U. L.J. 173 (2007); N.E.H.
Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law
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Others stem from the nature of arbitration itself and, more particularly,
from the inherent tension between arbitral and judicial functions in the
arbitration arena. Still other difficulties-some of them the least
expected-reflect what I might call the "internationality" of this
particular project. 2 It is the latter that chiefly occupy me in this paper.
II. BACKGROUND ISSUES

Of course, any Restatement worth producing, because it falls within
an area of the law needing clarification, simplification and-at least on
the margins-improvement, presents intellectual challenges. It is easy in
a paper that focuses, as this paper does, on the special challenges that
commercial arbitration's international character poses for the task of
restating the law in that field to overlook the presence of problems
having little or nothing to do with that character. But, of course, not all
the difficulties confronting the Restatement are due to the subject's
international character. It may be useful at the outset to indicate, by way
of illustration, some problems already raised by the Restatement that are
traceable more to the fact that the project concerns arbitrationthan that it
concerns internationalarbitration.
A. Scope of the Submission to Arbitration.
How far may parties go in building legal content into the notion of
the "scope of the submission to arbitration"? May, for example, the
exclusion in a contract of a particular form of damages for breach be
considered as raising a matter of "scope," so that if the arbitrators,
notwithstanding the prohibition, proceed to award such damages, that
portion of the award may be vacated or denied enforcement as lying
"beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration"? 3 Should it matter in
this regard whether the exclusion is contained in the arbitration clause
4
itself, rather than in a separate and independent contractual clause?
By way of further example, may a provision in an arbitration clause
directing the tribunal to make a "true and correct" application of the
chosen law properly be considered as an aspect of "scope," so that if the
tribunal errs in its application of law, it will have exceeded the scope of
Institute, 8 Law & Hist. Rev. 55 (1990).
For a discussion not only of the history of ALl projects, but of the trend in ALl
2.
projects toward "transnational work," see Lance Liebman, The American Law Institute: A
Modelfor the New Europe? (2008) (unpublished manuscript, paper available from ALI).
3. The leading cases confronting this issue include Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co.
v. Societe Grn&ale de l'industrie du papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Fertilizer Corp. of

India v. IDIMgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
This issue appears not to have been squarely decided in any judicial opinion.
4.
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its authority, thus rendering the award, to that extent, subject to
annulment and unenforceable?' Courts will want to be attentive to the
risk of thereby circumventing Hall Street Associates6 bar against
expanded judicial review of awards under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)7 and, more generally, of entering impermissibly into the realm of
merits review. The restaters will have to establish some standards for
ensuring that the notion of "scope of the submission to arbitration" is not
manipulated to the point that the benefits associated with arbitration, as
compared to litigation, are forfeited.
B. Arbitrability
The question of statutory non-arbitrability has become mostly
academic in the United States since the federal courts have deemed
virtually every statutory cause of action to be arbitrable.' This of course
could change under certain amendments to the FAA currently under
consideration in Congress.9 Even apart from that, unexpected questions
about arbitrability, in this strict sense of the term, have arisen. For
example, is non-arbitrability, as a ground for denying recognition or
enforcement, to be determined in accordance with the specific statutory
claim (e.g. the Sherman Act) being advanced or, instead, with the whole
subject matter field (antitrust) within which the claim falls? If a statutory
claim were to be deemed non-arbitrable, would that mean only that
arbitrators may not entertain causes of action based upon that statute, or
would it also mean that they may not entertain a defense to a breach of
contract claim insofar as the defense is predicated on a breach of that
statute? Moreover, we may assume that whether a claim is arbitrable or
not, in this narrow sense of the term, represents a question of law as to
which a court is to exercise fully independent judgment. But we
increasingly encounter statutory causes of action that a legislature has
declared "conditionally arbitrable," that is to say, arbitrable only subject

5.
In all likelihood, such a provision would be treated as an impermissible attempt to
heighten the standard of review of arbitral awards under the FAA, as proscribed by the
Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 592 (2008).
6.
Id. at 577.
7.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2000) [hereinafter the
FAA].
8.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 767-72 (2009). For
the most recent example coming from the Supreme Court, see 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and
unmistakably calls for arbitration of disputes under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act is enforceable).
9.
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,H.R. 1020, 11 lh Cong. (2009).
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to certain safeguards.'o The agreement to arbitrate may by statute need to
be separately signed or printed in a certain size font, or may be
enforceable only if a consumer has not repudiated the agreement within a
specified cooling off period. Does the question whether these conditions
have been satisfied have a powerful enough factual component to justify
showing a certain degree of deference on the matter to an arbitral tribunal
that may already have addressed it, even if arbitrability is ordinarily a
purely legal question on which no judicial deference to the arbitrators is
owed?
C. FederalPreemption
Federal legislation all too often fails to indicate with clarity its
intended preemptive effect vis-A-vis state law, and more should probably
not be expected from an old and inadequate statute like the Federal
Arbitration Act. According to the greater weight of authority, the FAA
does not preclude the application of state arbitration law, even in
interstate arbitration cases, provided the state law is not inconsistent with
the FAA.'" But when is a state law inconsistent with the FAA? The
Hall Street Associates decision 2 creates something of a puzzle in this
regard. If the FAA is so offended by party agreements expanding the
level of judicial review of awards in vacatur that such agreements are
invalid and unenforceable, may parties then achieve exactly the same
result by opting out of the FAA altogether and submitting their
arbitration agreement to state law instead, as Hall Street implies they
may be able to do?'"
D. Article 17V
According to Article XIV of the New York Convention, "a
Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the Convention
against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound
to apply the Convention." 4 How is this provision to be understood?
Should the drafters be understood to have thereby imposed a "secondary"
reciprocity requirement? In other words, may a State not only by
declaration limit its Convention obligations to awards rendered on the
10.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act (MFA), 15
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2002) (preclusion of pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
I1. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
12. Hall, supra note 5 at 576.
13. The California Supreme Court has already so ruled. Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DirecTV, 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1340, 190 P.3d 586, 589 (2008).
14. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. XIV, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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territory of another Contracting State, but also refuse to recognize or
enforce an award, even if rendered in another Contracting State, if, under
mirror-image circumstances, a U.S. award would be denied recognition
or enforcement in that other State under its implementation of the
Convention? The article's phrasing ("a Contracting State shall not be
entitled to avail itself of the Convention against other Contracting States .
.

.

") seems to contemplate a direct action by one Contracting State

against another for violation of the latter's New York Convention
obligations. But might the absence of such "secondary" reciprocity also
be raised in the context of a private party's attempt to have a Convention
award recognized or enforced?"
E. Effect and Weight of PriorDeterminations
But the example that perhaps best typifies the kind of uncertainties
in international commercial arbitration that a Restatement in the field
might hope to address is the question of the effect and weight of prior
judicial determinations of issues recurring over the life of an arbitration.
It is inherent in the staged life-cycle of arbitration that a number of
fundamental questions are apt to surface repeatedly at various moments
over the course of an arbitration's lifetime. Did an arbitration agreement
come into being? Is a given person a party to that agreement? Is the
agreement for any reason invalid or unenforceable? Have the various
contractual preconditions, if any, to triggering enforcement of the
arbitration agreement been satisfied? Does the dispute at hand fall
within the scope of disputes subject to the agreement to arbitrate? Is the
kind of dispute at hand one that is legally capable of being arbitrated in
the first place?
These issues-sometimes crudely lumped together as issues of
"arbitrability"-may surface repeatedly over the arbitration's life-cycle,
sometimes in the same court, sometimes in a court of a different
jurisdiction. They may surface as a jurisdictional defense to a suit
brought in a court of law when the claim before the court arguably comes
within the scope of the arbitration agreement, or as a basis for seeking an
order to compel arbitration of the claim. They may surface again, after
the arbitration has already begun, when a court is asked for one of the
stated reasons to issue a stay of the arbitration on one or more of these
same grounds.
15.

On this issue, the arbitration literature is divided. Compare Leonard V. Quigley,

Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1074 (1961), with GARY B.
BORN, supra note 8, at 2393-94.
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If the arbitration nevertheless proceeds and culminates in an
award, a vacatur proceeding in the place of arbitration will provide an
opportunity for the losing party to revisit each of these questions again in
an attempt to have the award set aside. Added to these first issues will
now be a second series of issues relating not to the validity,
enforceability or coverage of the agreement to arbitrate, but to aspects of
the arbitral proceeding itself, including the composition of the tribunal
and the adequacy of a party's opportunity to be heard. If no set aside
action is brought, or if one is brought but fails, may the same or similar
questions be again revisited on the occasion of the award being presented
to court in another jurisdiction in an action for enforcement?
A standard and tempting response would be to invoke the judicial
forum's generally applicable rules on judgment recognition.' 6 These
prior determinations are judgments after all, whether of courts of the
same jurisdiction or of another. Or, are these issues so critical to the
legitimacy of the underlying arbitral proceedings and the resulting award
that they deserve fresh consideration at each stage? Or would some
intermediate solution, in the form of limited deference, be a better
solution? There may also arise the converse problem: when, if at all and
under what circumstances, may a party that had the opportunity to raise
one or more of these objections at a prior stage in the arbitral life cycle,
but failed to do so, then be deemed estopped from doing so at a later
stage?" Are such objections, in short, subject to implied waiver?
F. Choice ofLaw
To virtually all the questions I have here raised, and others, there
may be added a choice of law layer of analysis. The answers to some of
these questions may so impact the effectiveness of arbitration that they
call for answers drawn, if not from the language of the FAA, than from
its spirit and underlying purposes." The answers to others may have so
profoundly a procedural character as to warrant governance by the law of
16. In the vacatur context, see, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance
Corp., 63 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1995) (award improperly vacated because earlier decision to
consolidate arbitrations was not properly subject to reconsideration due to the law of the case
doctrine).
17. See, e.g., Cobec Brazilian Trading & Warehousing Corp. v. Isbrandtsen, 524 F. Supp.
7, 9 (S.D. N.Y. 1980) (party generally deemed to have waived an objection by failing to raise
it in earlier judicial proceedings).
18. For an example, consider burden of proof. Though the FAA is silent on the matter,
courts have generally, based on the FAA's broad pro-arbitration philosophy, placed on the
party resisting recognition or enforcement the burden of establishing a ground for nonrecognition and non-enforcement of an award. See, e.g., Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe
Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1292 n.3 (I l'th Cir. 2004).

306

WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 16:300

the forum." Still others, for reasons of federalism or otherwise, may
more properly be left to state law,20 whether statutory or common law in
form. Choice of law issues abound.
III. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AN ARBITRATION RESTATEMENT
The problems just canvassed represent only a handful of the kind
that restaters of a field of law justifying a Restatement should expect to
face; otherwise a Restatement would not seriously be needed. But there
exists an entire overlay of challenges that are traceable specifically to the
international character of the subject undergoing restatement. It is on
these challenges that I intend at this point to dwell.
In this paper, I address four such challenges. First, to what extent
is international law a proper subject of a Restatement or similar project in
the first place? Second, should the law delineate the national and
international aspects of the subject, and if so, how? Third, what are the
legal "givens"-by which I mean legal understandings that restaters
cannot avoid and to which they must accommodate themselves when
restating the law-when a Restatement subject is international in
character? Fourth, and finally, how conscious should one be, in restating
the U.S. law of an international subject, of the legal principles and
practices within other jurisdictions. All four questions reflect ways in
which restating American law represents a different enterprise when that
law situates itself within a distinctly international field, as compared to
the more traditional fields of ALI activity. (I use the term "more
traditional," rather than "more usual," precisely because, with the
passage of time, treating matters of international law in ALI
Restatements can no longer be described as unusual).

A. InternationalLaw as a Restatement Subject
Writing in 2001, ALI vice-president Conrad Harper described the

early years of the American Law Institute as ones in which reference to
international law could not even be described as "episodic"; "occasional"
was as much one could say. 2' Even the Conflicts of Law Restatements 22

19. An example might be the availability of aforum non conveniens defense to actions to
enforce a foreign arbitral award. See P&P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861, 870 n.6
(10th Cir. 1999).
20. An example would be the availability of immediate appeal from rulings granting or
denying enforcement of a non-Convention award or from state court rulings granting or
denying enforcement of a Convention award. (In federal courts, a right of immediate appeal is
guaranteed by FAA Section 16(a)(1)(D)).
21.

Michael Traynor, The President'sLetter, ALl REPORTER (Fall 2004).

22.

RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (1934).
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the Second 23 -made at most incidental mention of the
-including
transnational aspects of conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicts of law. In
that respect of course, the Conflicts Restatements were no different in
character than the conflicts of law scholarship of the day.
The picture has changed markedly over the last 20 to 25 years, with
international law-oriented projects figuring ever more prominently on the
ALI agenda. While this development has hardly been systematic, the
international law initiatives of the ALI may nevertheless conveniently be
divided into three distinctive species-a fact that in itself reveals the
breadth of the "international" phenomenon.
1. The U.S. Law ofInternationalLaw
A first species, exemplified by the Restatements of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States,24 is one that advances a substantive
United States law position on an international law subject. That model
fit perfectly the intentions of the restaters for that project, which was to
treat foreign relations law as a body of law that was as "national" as any
other body of law, its "foreign relations" subject matter notwithstanding.
It comes as no surprise that the U.S. legal understanding of international
law, and public international law in particular, is not a global
understanding. While it is no secret that the drafters of the Second
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law sought to align U.S.
understandings of international law more closely with understandings of
international law held in certain other legal and political systems, there
was never any doubt that it was U.S. understandings of international law
that were being restated or otherwise advanced. It may not be
particularly convenient that international law understandings differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it should not surprise us that they do.
While an ALI project having the ambition to set forth the U.S. law
on an international law subject may readily take the distinctive
Restatement form, that form is not the only available or appropriate one.
When, for example, the ALI entered into the arena of recognition and
enforcement of foreign country judgments, it chose to develop not a
Restatement, but a draft federal statute on the subject.25 Of course, a
major consideration in pursuing that strategy was the circumstance that a
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (1971).
23.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
24.
(1965), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(1987).
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
25.
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (2006).

OF FOREIGN

JUDGMENTS:

ANALYSIS AND
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Hague Convention on the subject was being developed,2 6 and such an
instrument, if signed and ratified by the United States, was assumed to
require federal implementing legislation. It would have made little sense
to pursue a Restatement of an international law field that promised to
become the subject of an international treaty requiring implementing
legislation.
The Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration follows the path charted by the Restatement of Foreign
Relations law. It will set out the U.S. law governing international
commercial arbitration, and, like the Foreign Relations Law Restatement,
need to come to terms with legal norms, whether constitutional, statutory
or treaty in origin, that are unavoidably "American." I shall have
occasion to consider the nature of these constitutional, statutory and
treaty "givens" more closely in a later section.
2. The InternationalLaw ofInternationalLaw
The mode of presenting a body of international law that I have just
described, and that will be used in the present Restatement project, is
only one among several. Binding international law is being made on
today's international legal landscape also under the aegis of certain
distinctive international regimes, that is, regimes whose institutions are
themselves in the business of issuing authoritative pronouncements of
international law. Among these, WTO law is of special legal interest in
the U.S. due to the combination of an international agreement (the
Uruguay Round amendments) 27 and its federal implementing legislation
(the Uruguay Round amendments implementation statute).28 WTO law
is unquestionably a product of the WTO's own institutions, both
legislative and judicial, even though its practical impact is limited by its
not being understood to generate individually enforceable rights and
obligations in U.S. courts. 29 Still, nothing would prevent the ALI from
commissioning a Restatement of a body of law of this kind, and calling it
a Restatement, even though what would be restated would be the law
generated by the organs of an international organization, a "truly"
international law.
When the ALI set out to address WTO law in this fashion, it

26. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission, Oct. 30, 1999.
27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, The Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. I (1994).
28. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1).
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employed the term "Principles" rather than "Restatement."" One might
suppose that this nomenclature reflected an assumption that the only law
that an institution like the ALI can properly "restate" is domestic U.S.
law, even if domestic law on an international law subject. But why
should it be that the only law the ALI can properly restate is domestic
law? The central objective of Restatements is to clarify and consolidate
the law for understanding and application by U.S. courts." If WTO law
were understood, as it happens not to be, to give rise to individually
enforceable rights and obligations in U.S. courts, a Restatement of this
field of law would be as valuable to the judiciary as are Restatements in
any other field of law that U.S. courts have occasion to apply. I suspect
that the real reason the ALI chose to present its work on WTO law in the
form of principles, rather than a Restatement, is that WTO law is simply
still in too nascent a stage to presume to be restated.
Other fields that are international, in the sense of being made by
international institutions, bodies, and that could form the subject of
Principles along the lines of the ALI's Principles of WTO law, include
the international law of investor protection. This particular body of law
is essentially being made today by international arbitral tribunals, under
the aegis of ICSID, NAFTA or the multitude of bilateral investment
treaties in force. Use of the term "Principles" would be as apt here as in
the case of WTO law; the understanding of even the most fundamental
norms of investor protection law such as "fair and equitable treatment,"
cannot be considered as any more than nascent.
3. Principlesfor Addressing Cross-Borderor Common Problems
A third species of ALI activity in international law includes
instruments for dealing with recurrent cross-border situations. Such
instruments neither restate a distinctively American law on an
international law subject (as in the Foreign Relations Law Restatement)
nor restate the international law on an international subject (as in the
Principles of WTO law). Rather, they seek to accomplish a quite
different task, namely to foster the development among jurisdictions of
common principles for the treatment of problems that are either "crossborder" in nature or simply commonly experienced. Ventures of this sort
are both "more" and "less" than the Restatements and Principles just
considered. They are "more" because they go beyond what can currently
30. American Law Institute [hereinafter A.L.I.], PRINCIPLES OF TRADE LAW: THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2003).
See generally, N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the
31.
Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55 (1990).
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claim to constitute law, but "less" because they lack the character of law
in the full sense of the word. ALI projects of this kind reflect the
emergence of what may best be considered as a kind of "soft law."
Unsurprisingly, the term "Principles" recurs regularly in projects of this
kind as well.
The ALI prototype is the Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure, 32 an instrument produced jointly by the ALI and
UNIDROIT. The Transnational Principles and Rules represent something
along the lines of a model code for handling the procedural aspects of
transnational litigation of civil and commercial law disputes. While they
are positive law nowhere, they may be candidates for adoption either as
positive law, as a procedural model that parties may direct international
arbitrators to employ (or that arbitrators could possibly employ without
direction by the parties), or as a source of "best practices" for courts and
regulators in their application of independently existing procedural
norms. The presence in a dispute of a "transnational" element, within the
meaning of the Principles and Rules, justifies our considering an
instrument of this kind as a third type of international ALI product. The
rationale for such a project is that truly transnational transactions or
relationships may be more effectively regulated by instruments that have
been designed for that purpose than by bodies of law that were fashioned
in a purely domestic setting.
The possibilities for this species of international law project are
legion. A more recent example is the ALI's Principles Governing
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Intellectual
Property Disputes. The drafters sought to distill and develop a body of
principles on issues of private international law in the intellectual
property area that might prove attractive to policymakers across
jurisdictions. In that respect, the ALI drew closer to the kind of work
traditionally performed by bodies like the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 34 UNIDROIT, 35 and UNCITRAL. 36 It is then really a
small step for the ALI to move, as the Hague Conference, UNIDROIT
and UNCITRAL themselves have done, to the elaboration of specific
32.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (1998).
33.
A.L.I., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008).

34. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Revised Text), Oct. 931, 1951, 220 U.N.T.S. 123; 226 U.N.T.S. 384; 510 U.N.T.S. 317.
35.
UNIDROIT - INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (Rome 1994).

36. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 2205(XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2205 (Dec. 17, 1966).
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inter-jurisdictional mechanisms for managing transnational problems.
The ALI had at one point, for example, developed Guidelines on Courtto-Court Communications in Insolvency Proceedings 37-a project that
initially was limited to the NAFTA countries but that has more recently
expanded to the development of cooperative mechanisms for
transnational bankruptcies more generally.
A problem does not need to have a distinctively transnational
element to it to justify its being considered as an international initiative
on the ALI's part. It is true that aggregate and collective litigation in
national courts more and more often involve a multinational body of
claimants. But, even if they do not, the fact remains that the effective
handling of collective and aggregate litigation is a problem challenging
contemporary legal systems across the board, even though
internationality does not lie at the core of the problem. When the ALI
commissioned the establishment of a project on the Principles of
Aggregate Litigation,39 it proceeded on the assumption that the
difficulties associated with collective and aggregate litigation are so
commonly felt among jurisdictions around the world that it was worth
launching an international effort, even in the absence of a distinctly
transnational element in the underlying scenarios. The project is meant
to produce a set of principles that legislatures around the world might
observe in designing litigation mechanisms for collective redress.
Of course, it is precisely in the context of endeavors such as these
that comparative law takes center stage. A common search for legal
solutions draws upon comparative law for inspiration, to determine the
extent to which those solutions fit the legal environments in which they
may eventually be introduced. In fact, this third species of international
work is by no means entirely new. The ALI made an early foray into this
mode of inquiry in its international human rights project of the 1940s,
which resulted in a "Statement of Essential Human Rights," 40 a
Statement that was never published, much less adopted, but that
powerfully influenced the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.41
37. A.L.I., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE
NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003).
38. A.L.I., Institute Moves Forwardwith TransnationalInsolvency Project,availableat
http://www.ali.org/aiiold?R2804-07-transnationinsolv.htm (2007).
39. For information on the A.L.I., PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION,

see http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction-projects.proj-ip&projectid=7.
40.

A.L.I., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 75TH ANNIVERSARY (1998).

41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(Ill), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
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B. Delimiting National and InternationalLaw
The examples given above suggest how untenable it has become to
delineate sharply between national and international law. Take the
Restatement of International Commercial Arbitration. One might want
to confine the inquiry to cases in which one or more elements in an
arbitration is "foreign," i.e., in which one or both parties are foreign, the
place of arbitration is foreign, the cause of action arises under foreign
law (or foreign law is otherwise applicable), the production of evidence
or provisional relief that is needed is foreign, or the award was rendered
on foreign territory. But transactions that are international in one or
more of these respects may nevertheless fall squarely within the ambit of
a preexisting body of domestic law that was, however, almost certainly
designed for domestic cases.
U.S. arbitration law offers a prime example. The FAA, which
applies in principle to all the "foreign" scenarios recited above, is the
same regime that is applicable to purely domestic interstate arbitration.
On many issues, foreign arbitral awards will be treated by U.S. courts no
differently than domestic arbitral awards, and the truly voluminous FAA
case law developed for domestic cases under the FAA will bear directly
on the many fewer foreign arbitration cases. (Admittedly, on an issue
like the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, and to a lesser
extent arbitration agreements, the FAA has separate regimes for domestic
and foreign awards, with FAA Chapter One 42 governing the former, and
FAA Chapters Two 4 3 and Three" governing the latter, but this was due
to the necessity of statutorily implementing international conventions on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 45) In fact,
the leading precedents regularly cited in cases concerning foreign arbitral
Volt, 48
Corporation,47
Southland
awards-Prima Paint,46
Mastrobuono,49 First Options,50 Hall Street Associates5'-are cases
displaying no foreign element whatsoever, but falling within federal
legislative competence, hence the FAA, because they involved interstate,
as opposed to purely intrastate, commerce. Even so, these cases are as
42.
43.
44.
45.

FAA §§ 1 -16.
Id. at §§ 201-08.
Id. at §§ 301-07.
See supra note 14.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984).
Volt Info. Sciences v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).

51.

Hall, supra note 5 at 576.
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foundational for international arbitration in U.S. courts as they are for
interstate arbitration. To that extent, the distinction between the national
and the international is largely artificial.
Of course, not all lines that one is tempted to draw in a project like
the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration
implicates the distinction between domestic and international law. For
example, in the run-up to this Restatement project, far more attention
was given to the question whether investor-State disputes should be
brought within the ambit of the project than to the question of where
domestic ends and international begins.52 Investment arbitration, as it
has developed over the past 15 years or so, bears many features that
importantly distinguish it from standard international commercial
arbitration. The State will ordinarily not have been a party to the
underlying transaction constituting the investment; the conduct of the
respondent State will almost invariably be conduct taken pursuant to its
sovereign prerogatives; the relationship between claimant and respondent
will be treaty rather than contract-based. The law applicable to the
dispute will not be the law applicable to the underlying investment
transaction, but rather the law governing investor protection under the
relevant international agreement; the pressure for transparency in what is
otherwise the distinctively non-transparent world of international
commercial arbitration (not to mention the very notion of amicus curiae
briefs) is unique to foreign investment disputes. And so on.
It might be argued that this combination of special features justifies
carving investor-State disputes out of the ALI Restatement altogether.
That argument alone is testament to the high degree of differentiation
and fragmentation of international law, even in a domain so seemingly
unified as international arbitration. However, it was ultimately decided
not to carve out such disputes from the Restatement, largely for the same
reason, though in reverse, that it makes little sense to ignore domestic
FAA cases in dealing with the international cases. If international
commercial arbitration forms the bedrock of investor-State arbitration, it
does not make a great deal of sense to segregate the latter for entirely
separate treatment.
Were the Arbitration Restatement to address
substantive law, my position would be quite different. The United
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)" and the
52.

George A. Bermann, Restating International Arbitration, American Society of

International Law, Proceedings of the 101s" Annual Meeting, April 1, 2008 (forthcoming
2009).
53. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I (1980).
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UNIDROIT Principles,54 among other instruments, which figure
prominently as the applicable law in international arbitrations arising out
of sales transactions, stand worlds apart from the investor protection
principles that have been built into NAFTA and bilateral investment
treaties. But, since the Restatement will have little to say about the
substantive rules of decision to be applied in the arbitration, the
distinction between investor-State and commercial arbitration bears
much less significance. The distinction does not fade away entirely;
certain procedural issues like transparency, for example, will inevitably
be treated differently. But the distinction does fade.
C. Constraintsin FashioningInternationalLaw Restatements
While Restatements of the law seek chiefly to clarify and
consolidate the law, they may also afford an occasion for some
significant reshaping of the law in one aspect or another. Yet the latitude
that restaters enjoy is limited, because every field is populated with at
least some norms that cannot, or at least are not supposed to, be violated
or ignored. I referred to these earlier as "givens," in the sense that they
must be respected and accommodated, even by restaters. Historically,
such privileged authorities have included (a) settled constitutional
understandings, (b) legislation of reasonably settled meaning, (c)
international agreements of reasonably settled meaning to which the U.S.
is a party (at least those that have been statutorily implemented or are
deemed to be self-executing), and (d) reasonably settled case law of the
U.S. Supreme Court (or of state supreme courts, where state law is
concerned). Some legal principles are, for the restaters, what in private
international law terms would be called mandatory." Their disrespect by
restaters would impair the legitimacy, and certainly the utility, of the
resulting Restatement.
The first generation of Restatements, which were produced in
roughly the first twenty years of the ALI starting in 1923, and which
dealt with subjects such as agency, conflict of laws, contracts, judgments,
property, restitution, security interests, torts and trusts, suffered few
constraints in this regard. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it was
assumed to have rather little to say on these subjects. As for legislation
of settled meaning, it would almost invariably have been situated at the
state level. Interestingly, the presence of one or more pieces of state
54. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/main.htm.
55. George A. Bermann, Introduction: Mandatory Rules of Law in International
Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 1 (2007).
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legislation on a topic falling within the ambit of the Restatement was not
thought of as getting very much in the way of those Restatement
projects. Rather, those projects proceeded largely as if the existence of
state legislation were no impediment. This may have been due in part to
traditional notions that statutes should be construed as only narrow
derogations from the common law." It may also have been assumed
that, while the courts of State A could not be expected to follow a
Restatement provision that conflicts with the enacted legislation of that
State, the same Restatement provision could nevertheless be influential
in States B and C, lacking any such conflicting legislation. Of course,
were the legislatures of State B or C to intervene by enacting legislation
such as State A's, that legislation would prevail, as a matter of local law.
For their part, treaties and other international agreements had virtually
nothing to say on the subjects of the early Restatements, at least not
directly. Nor, finally, was there much scope for settled U.S. Supreme
Court case law, at least not in a post-ErieRailroadv. Tompkins" world.
Such is the idyllic landscape on which the Restaters, at least in
retrospect, appear to have originally been deploying their efforts. This
was the case not only for the first wave of Restatements, but also for the
majority of Restatements in the second and third series.
The U.S. law of international commercial arbitration, in the year
2009, presents a rather different picture. Admittedly, apart from possible
concerns over due process in arbitral procedure, the U.S. Constitution
has rather little to say on the subject. But the other categories of
"givens" mentioned above are very much in play. By way of legislation,
there looms large a major, if outdated, piece of federal legislation in the
form of the Federal Arbitration Act. However, as enacted in 1925, the
FAA seems almost oblivious to international arbitration, at least as far as
arbitral awards rendered abroad are concerned. Almost incredibly, from
today's vantage point, Chapter One of the FAA contemplates arbitrations
arising out of interstate and foreign commerce, but seems to assume that
all such arbitrations will be situated in the United States. The Act refers
not to recognition or enforcement of awards (terminology generally
associated with foreign awards), but to their vacatur or confirmation
(terminology generally associated with domestic awards). Were the
FAA to be enacted today, it would surely not employ such limiting
language.
When Chapters Two" and Three59 were added to the FAA to
56.
57.
58.

See Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 79 (1877).
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 302 U.S. 671 (1937).
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2010).
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implement the New York and Panama Conventions, respectively, they
expressly brought the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards within the scope of the Act. But the Conventions invited
Contracting States to declare upon ratification that they would not be
bound to recognize or enforce foreign awards unless rendered on the
territory of a State party to the Convention, 60 and the United States, like
most other Contracting States, so declared. 6 ' The logical result is that
awards rendered on the territory of States not parties to one of the
Conventions are specifically governed neither by Chapter One of the
FAA (since not made domestically) nor by Chapters Two or Three
(because not New York or Panama Convention awards). I return to this
problem below, but the point to be made here is that the Restatement of
the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration has to reconcile
itself with national legislation such as the FAA, as it stands, with all its
idiosyncrasies and shortcomings.
Arbitration statutes are found at the state level as well. According
to prevailing case law, state arbitration legislation is not categorically
preempted by the FAA, though it will be inapplicable to the extent
inconsistent with the FAA,62 and much of this legislation, whether by its
terms or impliedly, applies to international as well as domestic
arbitration. I noted above that the early restaters, operating in essentially
common law areas such as torts, contracts, property or agency,
proceeded as if free to take little or no account of existing state laws. But
the situation may well be different when a Restatement intervenes in a
field in which Congress has already importantly legislated. Such a
Restatement effectively builds a kind of federal common law of statutory
interpretation, and in so doing poses a much more substantial threat to
state law, if only because the capacity of state law to reassert itself
legislatively will depend upon the state of federal preemption in the area
of law in question.
Assuming the FAA does not occupy the international arbitration
field to the exclusion of state law, but rather permits resort to state
arbitration law to the extent not inconsistent with the FAA, how is
"inconsistency" with the FAA to be ascertained? If the FAA places a

59. Id. at §§ 301-307.
60. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arts. 1,
3, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518 [hereinafter the New York Convention].; Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14
I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter the Panama Convention].
61. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.§ 305 (2010).
62. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,6 (1984).
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ceiling on the grounds available for vacatur of local awards, or on the
grounds for denying recognition or enforcement of foreign awards, does
that mean that the parties may have no resort to state law that permits
more searching review? This is precisely the question on which the
Supreme Court's recent Hall Street Associates decision63 has managed to
send profoundly mixed signals. In sum, drafters of a Restatement,
entering upon the international commercial arbitration field, find
themselves in anything but the juridical vacuum that the early restaters
somehow assumed themselves to be, whether they actually were or not.
The Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration also differs from most of the early Restatements in regard to
the "givens" established by settled Supreme Court pronouncements in
the field. Unlike those early Restatements, anchored as they were in
state common law, this Restatement proceeds on terrain on which the
Supreme Court has been keeping remarkably busy, up to and including
the current term, 64 in establishing new "givens" for the field. However
one may assess the contribution that recent Supreme Court rulings have
made to clarity and coherence in the international commercial arbitration
field,6 5 the fact remains that determining the extent to which the Supreme
Court has "finally settled" a point of law within the field is a feat not to
be underestimated.
Finally, as already implied, international agreements occupy a place
in the international commercial arbitration field that the drafters of the
early Restatements could not have imagined, and thereby supply restaters
with additional "givens." But instruments like the New York, Panama
and ICSID conventions,66 and the innumerable bilateral investment
67
treaties that contemplate the arbitration of foreign investment disputes,
also present some noteworthy gaps. As noted, the only chapters of the
FAA that deal with foreign arbitral awards are Chapters Two and Three,
implementing
the
New
York
and
Panama
Conventions,
from
encounters
one
But
only.
Conventions
respectively-and those
time to time international arbitral awards that are not Convention awards
63. Hall, supra note 5 at 576.
64. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009); Vaden v. Discover Bank,
129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
65. See cases cited supra note 22.
66. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, openedfor signatureAugust 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T, 1270.
67. Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking,
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).; The Entry into
Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20069_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
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(notably because the State where the award was made is not a contracting
State and thus fails the Convention's reciprocity requirement). Do the
awards rendered on the territory of States as commercially significant as,
say, Liechtenstein and Taiwan, which have not ratified the New York
Convention, fall between the cracks merely because they are
definitionally not Convention awards? Should FAA Chapter One, or
possibly even Chapters Two or Three, apply to these awards on the
ground that, whatever else, such awards arise out of interstate or foreign
commerce and should be considered as well within the FAA's domain?"
Or are these awards relegated to the vagaries of state statutory or
common law of arbitration69-- result that may seem archaic, but that
actually obtains even today in the closely related field of the recognition
and enforcement of foreign country judgments, where we admittedly find
no federal legislation, not even as rudimentary as the FAA?70 Might we
even be prepared to take the leap of asserting that, given the prominence
of federal law in the international arbitration field, a sort of federal
common law must be developed for coping with this "interstitial"
subcategory of international awards?"
In short, it is one thing for the ALI to develop a Restatement in a
purely common law field, or in one populated by few and scattered
pieces of state or federal legislation, and quite another thing to do so
where not only a broad federal statute, but important multilateral and
bilateral international conventions dominate the field. One cannot help
but be struck by the number of issues that, at least in the case of these
non-Convention awards, are potentially governed by one or another
"residual" body of law. On some issues, like the availability of a
sovereign immunity defense to enforcement or the applicability of the act

of state doctrine, the case for a federal law rule is quite powerful. On
others-such as the availability of forum non conveniens as a basis for
stay of dismissal of an enforcement action, of summary procedures, or of
appeals from rulings on recognition or enforcement-the notion of
borrowing forum law makes a great deal more sense. On still otherslike the grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement of awards, the
burden of proof of the grounds, the reciprocity requirement, and the
68. There is a suggestion to this effect in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr.
Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000); San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals,
Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800, 801 (9th Cir. 1961).
69. See Weizmann Inst. of Science v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654 (S.D. N.Y. 2005).
70. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (in diversity cases,
federal courts apply the conflict of laws rules of the state in which they sit).
71. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 571, 579
(7th Cir. 2007).
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effectiveness of party agreements for expanded or lessened review as
compared with the FAA standard-there is a contest between the
residual application of state and common law, on the one hand, and a
more free-wheeling resort to an FAA-based body of federal common
law, on the other.
D. The Relevance ofForeignLaw
A remaining question of special interest to an international law
Restatement is the proper role of foreign law in such an enterprise.
A subject does not of course need to be international in character in
order for foreign law to serve the usual range of comparative law
purposes. Among the purposes comparative law serves is a better
appreciation of one's own law as it stands and a wider opening to the
ways in which it might be improved. No area of the law-even those
that were the Restatements' earliest terrains and that were decidedly
domestic in orientation-is beyond the reach of these core comparative
law purposes. But when a subject is international in character, as
international commercial arbitration assuredly is, foreign and
comparative law may be doubly instructive. They stand to confer their
usual benefits in the restaters' consideration of the substance and content
of the law being restated, but at the same time help equip restaters to
address the "interface" of legal systems that every truly international
subject entails in a legally globalized world.
The interface aspects of international commercial arbitration are
obvious, for international commercial arbitration simply does not
One need not assert some
"belong" to any single jurisdiction.
72
of international arbitration in order to
overarching "anationality"
appreciate this fact. The following six scenarios, among many others,
make the point:
1. A court of country A compels arbitration of a dispute in country B,
fully recognizing that the courts of country B may consider the
dispute not legally arbitrable and may have even chosen to enjoin the
arbitration or vacate the resulting award.
2. The courts of country C set aside an award in knowledge of the fact
that the courts of country D may nevertheless choose to recognize
and enforce the award if they consider country C's reasons for
setting aside the award to be insular or idiosyncratic.
3. The law of country E may permit the use of arbitral procedures that
the law of country F considers to be fundamentally unfair, so much
72. See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, The Rise of TransnationalLegal Practice and
the Task of ComparativeLaw, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1215 (2001).
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so as to cause a court of country F to withhold recognition from the
award.
4. Country G may be willing for its courts in principle to afford
provisional relief in relation to arbitral proceedings elsewhere, but
not when the tribunal sitting in country H is entertaining a claim that
the courts of country G consider to be within country G's exclusive
jurisdiction or violative of country G's notion of international public
policy.
5. The law of country I must decide whether its pro-arbitration policy is
so emphatic as to justify the issuance of an anti-suit injunction
targeting actions in the courts of country J whose pendency the
courts of country I consider to be in violation of the agreement to
arbitrate.
6. The courts of country K must decide, when asked to deny
enforcement to an award rendered in country L, how much weight to
give to the prior decisions of the courts of country L that the award
should not be vacated, or to the prior decisions of country M, whose
courts had decided to compel arbitration in the first place.
The point is this.
The proper functioning of international
commercial arbitration depends on the legal principles and practices of
multiple legal orders. A Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial Arbitration accordingly cannot fully achieve its purposes
unless it considers the multiple points at which this body of law and the
arbitration law of other jurisdictions interface. That aspect of the
challenge, more than any other, reveals international commercial
arbitration's distinctive multi-jurisdictional dependency.

